In macroeconomic models with jexible wages and prices, \vhether a tau is levied on producers or consumers does not affect its ultimate incidence. This equi~alence breaks down in the presence of short-run nominal rigidities. C'sing both British and American data, we procide evidence against complete N3age and price flexibility.
The side of a market on which a tax is levied is irrelevant in the standard microeconomic analysis of taxation. Students in elementary economics learn that it makes no difference whether a sales tax is collected from buyers or sellers. They are taught that the ultimate incidence of a payroll tax depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for labor, not on whether the tax is levied on employees or employers. Broader equivalence results concerning sales and income taxes are central to the analysis of general equilibrium tax incidence. Standard Keynesian macroeconomic analyses take a very different view. Raising sales taxes is thought to be inflationary, even if monetary policy remains unchanged. There is less concern that increases in direct taxation will increase prices.
The microeconomic and Keynesian views diverge because the former presumes flexible wages and prices. while the latter postulates *Department of Econonucs, MIT. Carnhndge, MA 02139: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge. MA 02139; and Department of Economics. Harvard University, Cambridge. MA 02138. respectibcly. We are indebted to Craig Alexander and I g n s c~o Mas for excellent research ahsistance, to Olivier Blanchard. Rudiger Dornbusch. Stanley Fischer. Greg hlankiw. two referees, and the co-editor. John Taylor. for helpful suggestions. and to the National Science Foundation for financial support. Frank DeLeeuw of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. and R. Doggett. K . Newman. and A. Tanslev of the U.K. Central Statistical OHice provided us wlth unpublished data. The reaearch reported here is part of the NBER's research programs in Economic Fluctuations and Taxation. Any opinions expressed are our own and not those of the NBER or NSF. rigid nominal wages. With wage rates fixed in the short run, sales tax increases necessarily raise prices; income tax increases have no such effect. If nominal wages are rigid over reasonable lengths of time, then the conventional tax analysis must be altered. Holding monetary policy constant, increases in the price level translate point for point into reductions in output. Even a temporary 1 percent decline in GNP could dwarf the potential efficiency gains from many proposed tax reforms.
The very existence of nominal rigidities is a subject of contemporary macroeconomic debate. Many Keynesian scholars take it as self-evident that nominal wages are sticky, at least in the short run. For example, Robert Solow invites his readers to "accept the apparent evidence of one's senses and [take] it for granted that the wage does not move flexibly to clear the labor market" (1980, p. 8) . Other researchers claim that there is no available evidence in support of this hypothesis. For example, Robert k n g and Charles Plosser write that "Keynesian models typically rely on implausible wage or price rigidities, from the textbook reliance on exogenous values to the recent more sophisticated effort of Fischer that relies on nominal contracts " (1984. p. 363) .
Examining how changes in the money stock affect macroeconomic activity, a standard test for nominal rigidities, is unlikely to resolve this issue conclusively. Shifts between direct and indirect taxation can provide tests which avoid many of the difficulties with money-based tests. since they are less likely to be endogenous responses to macroeconomic events. This paper employs
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both British and American data to investigate how shifts in the direct vs. indirect tax mix affect wages, prices, and output. Our results support the existence of nominal rigidities and suggest that they may have important effects which should be recognized when analyzing the short-run effects of tax reform. The paper is divided into five sections. Section I clarifies the equivalence of direct and indirect taxation when wages and prices are fully flexible. It also shows how these equivalences fail when nominal rigidities are introduced. Section I1 describes our methodology for examining the impact of tax changes. The next section explains how we construct effective direct and indirect tax rates for Britain and the United States. Section IV presents our empirical findings based on postwar time-series evidence from both countries. The concluding section sketches the implications of our results for the analysis of tax policy and macroeconomic fluctuations.
I. Shifts from Direct to Indirect Taxation: Classical and Keynesian Views
In textbook public finance models, the legal incidence of a sales tax is of no consequence. It does not matter whether the tax is collected from producers or consumers. More generally, the equivalence theorems summarized in George Break (1974) establish that in an economy without savings and with flexible prices, a sales tax on all goods is equivalent to an equal-revenue tax on all income. This section presents a simple classical macroeconomic model illustrating these results, and shows how they break down when wage and price stickiness is introduced.
The equivalence between sales and income taxation is easily demonstrated with perfectly flexible wages and prices.' In the short ' An appendix available from the authors on request shows that the equivalence between direct and indirect taxation on the same tax base follows from the logic of budget constraints and is not specific to thib simple model.
run, aggregate output ( Y ) is a function only of labor input ( N ) :
With competitive firms, an aggregate labor demand schedule can be obtained by equating the marginal product of labor to the firm's real wage:
where w is the nominal wage and s is an index of prices received by firms. The supply of labor depends on the purchasing power of the worker's payment for an hour of work:
where r is the income tax rate and 0 is the sales or, equivalently, value-added tax rate. Labor supply is unaffected by any reform which does not change (1 -~) / ( 1 + 0 ) .
The government raises revenue from both income and sales taxes. Tax collections, T, equal where E is household expenditure on goods and services, net of sales taxes. The household budget constraint in our one-period model is Total revenue is then For a given tax base, tax revenue depends only on (1 -~) / ( 1 + 0 ) .
Consider the effects of a balanced budget tax reform which increases 0 and reduces r while leaving (1 -~) / ( 1 + 0 ) ons st ant.^ Both or small values of 0, this is equivalent to the constancy of ( 7 -e). the real wage paid by firms ( w / s ) and the real wage received by workers [ ( I -r ) w / ( 1+ 6 ) s ] are unaffected, so output is constant. The price level must change, however. Let L ( Y ) define the demand for money balances. Equilibrium requires that where M is the nominal money supply. We have followed the standard practice of assuming that the demand for real money balances, deflated by market prices, depends on real output. Since output is unaffected by the tax shift, the after-tax price level s ( l + 6 ) will not change, and s will fall. Since w / s remains constant, the nominal wage must Although shfts between direct and indirect taxes are neutral in this model, increases in either are not. Since changes in the total tax burden have real effects in almost any economic model, studies of the effects of changes in specific taxes, such as those surveyed in Ewald Nowotny (1980) , do not shed light on the issues considered here.
The hallmark of Keynesian models is that n.omina1 adjustments require time. Changes in the stock of monev or shifts between direct and indirect taxation which have no long-run real effects therefore may have important short-run consequences. Sticky nominal wages are the primary rigidity in most Keynesian modek4 They arise both in textbook Keynesian models and in contract-'Alternative approaches might postulate that money demand depends on households' disposable income.
(1 -r ) Y . or that money balances should be deflated by an index of consumer prices. In the former case, a revenue-neutral shlft towards indirect taxation would reduce prices, while in the latter case, it would raise them. In neither case would real output be affected. N. Gregory Manluw and Summers (1984) present some evidence suggesting the empirical relevance of the case where money demand depends on household expenditure. Regardless of the money demand specification, tax changes will not affect the price level if monetary pollcy holds nominal GNP constant.
4~n earlier version of thls paper also examines price stickiness and real wage resistance and concludes that changes in the tax mix are also likely to have real effect5 in the presence of these rigidities.
ing models such as those of Stanley Fischer (1977) and John Taylor (1980) . Customarily, sticky wages are analyzed by adding a description of wage behavior to the classical model, while deleting the requirement that employment equal desired labor supply. Since both explicit and implicit contracts seem to be denominated in terms of pre-tax wages, we assume pre-tax wage rigidity. Since post-tax wages do not need to adjust to tax shifts, rigidities in ( 1-7 )~. do not imply that shifts between direct and indirect taxation have real effects.
Consider an increase in 8 which does not change ( 1-~) / ( 1 + 8 ) . Given that the nominal wage cannot fall to clear the labor market, employment must fall or prices must rise. In equilibrium, both occur to some extent since a fall in employment lowers output and therefore requires an increase in s ( l + 8 ) to satisfy (7).Keeping M. constant, ( I ) ,(2), and ( 7 ) imply that the elasticity of the tax-inclusive price with respect to a tax change is An increase in indirect taxes is similar to a supply shock, a "self-inflicted wound," since prices rise and output falls. T h s fall in output results from an increase in real wages facing firms, as producer prices decline while nominal wages remain constant.
We have isolated a clear difference in the empirical implications of models with and without nominal rigidities. A natural way of testing for the existence and importance of these rigidities is to examine the response of prices and output to changes in tax structure, controlling for total revenue collections. These tests, while not totally free of ambiguity, are superior to tests of the relationshp between money and output for detecting nominal rigidities. Tax structure changes are more likely to be exogenous policy shocks than are changes in the money stock. King and Plosser argue that changes
in the money stock may be endogenous. They establish that most of the observed correlation between money and output arises from changes in the money multiplier, not from changes in the stock of base money. The difficulty with tax changes is that they may have incentive and distributional effects whlch change real magnitudes; we argue below that these effects are unlikely to explain our empirical findings.
Methodology
Our aim is to test for the presence of nominal rigidities by studying whether changes in the tax mix affect prices and output. One approach to doing this would be to specify and estimate a structural model including tax variables. Different tax variables would enter different structural equations. Taxes on individual incomes, for example, would not enter equations describing firm behavior. The existence of nominal rigidities could be tested by examining the cross-equation restrictions which insure that changes in the tax mix are neutral. We do not adopt this strategy because of the diffificulty of convincingly s ecifying a complete macroeconomic model! Rather. we gain robustness at the possible expense of efficiency by directly examining the effects of changes in the tax mix using reduced forms. The reduced form of any model with classical properties should imply that tax mix changes do not affect output and prices.
We estimate two systems of equations. The first consists of three reduced-form equations for the logarithms of prices (p,), nominal after-tax wages (it,= w,(l-r,) ), and output (y,). The explanatory variables are lagged prices, wages, and output, as well as real government deficits (d,)and the logarithm of the money stock (m,). We also include three tax variables. The first is TTOT, the sum of the direct and indirect tax rates.
The second is TMIX, the diference between 'Previous estimates of the role of tax variables in Keynesian Phlllips curves and price equations presunle the presence of nominal rigidities, and thus do not test for their existence. the direct and indirect tax rates. Including both TMIX and TTOT is equivalent to including indirect and direct taxes separately. Since we are interested primarily in the effect of switches between direct and indirect taxes holding their sum constant, however, this specification is more natural. The third tax variable, OTAX, is the ratio of tax receipts which we classify as neither direct nor indirect taxes to GNP.6 This system of reducedform equations can be written as
where the al(L)'sare second-order lag polynomials. We found that further lagged variables had little explanatory power. Each equation in the system also includes a time trend and seasonal dummy variables.
The inclusion of contemporaneous variables on the right-hand side of the reducedform equations is a delicate issue. Since we treat TMIX as exogenous, an assumption defended below, its contemporaneous value appears in all the reduced-form equations. Entering contemporaneous monetary and fiscal policy variables as in (9) is strictly appropriate only if they are exogenous. For-'Since we include the sum of all taxes as well as the deficit, our specification is consistent with both the view that government expenditure is the appropriate measure of fiscal policy, and the view that the deficit is the appropriate measure. tunately, the results reported below change only negligibly when contemporaneous values of these variables are dropped from the equations. ' In addition to fiscal and monetary policy variables, it is desirable to control for shocks to the money demand equation which influence prices and output. If policy is set so as to offset these shocks, it may be appropriate to use nominal GNP as a summary variable for the effects of aggregate demand policies. These considerations led Robert Gordon (1983) to pioneer the use of nominal GNP in wage and price equations. While t h s approach captures velocity shocks, it may capture too much: the disadvantage of including nominal GNP is that it may not be a predetermined variable.
We estimate a second system of only two equations for nominal after-tax wages and prices whch includes current and lagged nominal GNP in place of the deficit and the money supply. This system of equations is given by where n , is the logarithm of nominal GNP.
In thls system, movements in output for a given nominal GNP can be calculated from price movements.
Systems (9) and (10) allow for unrestricted wage, price, and output responses to shifts between direct and indirect taxation. Both o or our purpose-estimating the effects of changes in an exogenous variable-it is of no consequence whether the reduced form is represented as in (9) or triangularized as in Christopher Sims (1980) . Keynesian and classical models imply, however, that revenue-neutral tax switches are neutral in the long run. We therefore impose (and test) long-run neutrality by restricting the sum of the TMIX coefficients in each equation to equal zero.8 Imposing long-run neutrality of TMIX sharpens the rejection of the hypothesis that TMIX is unimportant. The short-run tax neutrality hypothesis implies the restrictions a',(L) = a:(L) = a;(L) = 0 in system (9) and P:(L) = &?(L) = 0 in system (10). As long as TMIX is a valid exogenous variable, rejection of these null hypotheses is very unfavorable to the classical model. In Section IV we consider some (in our view unlikely) reasons why T M I X might appear to matter even if wages and prices were perfectly flexible.
After rejecting these null hypotheses, we focus on the relevance of these rejections for the presence of nominal rigidities. If nominal rigidities are present, then prices should rise and output should fall for some time after a tax switch. To investigate these dynamic effects, we compute our systems' predicted responses to a once and for all decrease in T M I X .
The reduced forms described above may be subject to some of the criticisms whch have been directed at the vector autoregression approach of Christopher Sims. We have not posited an explicit structural model, and the parameters in our reduced forms might vary with changes in the policy regime. We use our reduced forms, however, only to estimate the effects of certain policy changes h his way of imposing long-run neutrality is only valid if prices, wages, and output are stationaq wlule T M I X has a unit root. We could not reject either of these hypotheses.
w e also followed the spirit of Frederic Mishlun's (1979) approach. Tlus involves fitting a univariate autoregression for T M I X . Starting from a base path for T M I X , we constructed a new path for T M I X by simulating the effect on T M I X of a residual in t h s autoregression. We then compared the paths of prices, wages, and output resulting from these two paths for T M I X . This procedure avoids the problems which might arise if permanent shocks to T M I X are widely at variance with the historical experience. Because the results of the two approaches were v e q similar, we report only the permanent shock results.
w i t h a given policy regime. Our view is not that our equations explain how TMIX could be used as a major tool of stabilization policy, or even describe the effects of radical changes in TMIX outside the sample experience. Rather, we believe that the estimated response of prices and output to changes in TMIX, given the current policy regime, can shed light on the existence of nominal rigidities.
Any argument of this type must confront issues similar to those raised in the decadeslong debate about the relationship between money and output. The essential identification problem there involves the possibility that money and output are correlated either because they both respond to some third factor, or because changes in money are caused by expectations of changes in output. After presenting our empirical results, we present some evidence supporting the exogeneity of tax changes. At a minimum, it seems clear that changes in the tax mix are much closer to the ideal experiment for studying nominal rigidities than money supply changes.
The Data
This section describes our measures of the direct and indirect tax burden in Great Britain and the United States. It begins by discussing conceptual measurement issues which apply to both countries and then considers the data for each nation in some detail.
Direct taxes are defined as taxes on individuals, including income taxes and employee contributions for social insurance. Indirect taxes are those collected from firms. They include sales and value-added taxes, employer contributions for social insurance, and various exsise taxes. Our measured tax rates, ? and 8 , are defined as direct and indirect tax receipts as a share of GNP at market prices. These variables do not correspond precisely to the proportional tax rates, 7 and 8 , of Section I. If there were proportional taxes, income tax receipts would equal r Y , indirect tax receipts would be 8 ( G + E ) , and Gross National Product measured at market prices would be (1
where G denotes government expenditure.
Therefore, our measured tax rates would be and Both measured tax rates would be slightly lower than the proportional taxes in our stylized economy. T h s would bias our measurement of TMIX, since For values of 8 between 0 and .15, however, as in our sample, this bias would be small. In contrast, the measured tax rates would yield exactly the correct measure for the total tax burden, TTOT:
In Section I we analyzed tax reforms which Our approach to measuring tax rates is only one of many possibilities. Ideally, we would like our tax variables to be legislated tax rates whlch change only when government policy changes. Unfortunately, taxes are too complex for us to define either the direct tax rate or the indirect tax rate. The tax base is much smaller than GNP and taxes are frequently raised or lowered by changing the tax base. Direct taxes are not strictly proportional to income, nor indirect taxes proportional to expenditure. In particular, indirect taxes do not cover all goods.
If the elasticities of direct and indirect tax receipts with respect to GNP are different, then measured TTOT and TMIX variables may be affected by cyclical fluctuations. This could induce a spurious correlation between the tax variables, prices, and output. We therefore employ another technique for identifying shifts between direct and indirect taxation. We construct measures of full- . 1963-1983 employment TMIX and TTOT using data on full-employment tax receipts and GNP to .20T avoid problems due to cyclical fluctuations.
A. The United Kingdom
Direct taxes in the United Qngdom consist of personal income taxes and surtaxes and employees' national insurance contributions. Indirect taxes include a variety of different levies: Purchase Tax (prior to 1972), Value-Added Tax, stamp. customs, alcohol, and tobacco duties, car tax, as well as employers' contributions for National Insurance and Selective Employment Tax. Data on tax receipts were obtained from F~nancial Statistrcs and the Central Statistical Office. A detailed data description is available from the authors on request.
The resulting shares of direct and indirect taxes in GDP are plotted in Figure 1 . The share of indirect taxes ranges from just over 11 percent in 1963 to more than 15 percent during the early 1980's. There are even more significant movements in the direct tax share, which varies between 10.1 and 16.8 percent. The figure also shows that there are some tax reforms which correspond to shifts between the two sources of revenue. In particular, the 1979 tax reform involved a reduction of basic statutory income tax rates accompanied by systematic increases in VAT. The direct tax cuts were forecast to reduce revenue by 4.5 billion pounds, whle the increase in VAT was expected to raise 4.2 billion pounds. T h s is the cleanest example of a tax reform whch changed the "side of the market" on whch taxes are levied. We measure the British price level using the deflator for GDP at market prices.'' Our nominal wage measure is the index of basic weekly wage rates in all industries and services. Output is measured by real GDP at market prices. Our equations also include the logarithm of M I , the deficit as measured by the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement "Using the Retail Price Index to measure prices did not change our results. (PSBR), and the level of other tax receipts, defined as total government tax receipts less direct and indirect taxes, divided by GDP.'~ There are several intervals of statutory wage and price controls and implicit wageprice guidelines during our sample period. Previous attempts to find significant effects from price controls (for example, J. D. Sargan, 1980) have been unsuccessful. Wage controls do appear to have affected wage growth, however. S. G. B. Henry (1984) identifies five periods of statutory wage restraint and associated wage catch-up. We include his set of indicator variables for wage controls in all of our reduced-form equations.12 "Quarterly PSBR and M1 data are only available since 1963, and the wage series that we usc was not computed after 1983. Our sample period is therefore limited to the 84 quarters between 1963:l and 1983:4. I2There is some disagrecmcnt regarding the most binding periods of wage control. Gordon uses dummy variables which diff'er from those in Henry, and Sushi1 Wadhwani (1983) uses yet another set. Our results were insensitive to alternative choices. We amend Henry's variables by adding an indicator variable for rapid wage growth in the second quarter of 1978. 
B. The United States
Direct tax receipts for the United States include federal personal income tax receipts, state and local personal income tax receipts, and personal contributions for social insurance. Our measure of indirect taxes is the sum of federal indirect business taxes, which consist of both excise taxes and customs duties, state and local sales tax receipts, and private employer contributions for social insurance.13 Direct and indirect tax receipts as a fraction of GNP are shown in Figure 2 . The share of direct taxes in GNP displays substantial variability in the postwar period, ranging from only 7 percent in 1949 to nearly 15 percent early in the 1980's. Indirect taxes are much less volatile, ranging between 5.7 and 8.7 percent of GNP and trending upward throughout the sample period.
We measure the U.S. price level using the G N P deflator.14 Wages are measured as I3We exclude state and local government employer contributions from our calculation of social insurance contributions by employers.
140ur results were unchanged when we used the CPI-Urban Worker price index, excluding shelter, to measure the price level.
average hourly earnings in manufacturing, and output as GNP in 1972 dollars. Our equations include the logarithm of MI, the level of the total government deficit, and other tax receipts, defined as total tax receipts less direct and indirect taxes, divided by GNP. We also include two variables drawn from Gordon and Stephen G n g (1982) to allow for the impact of wage and price controls during the early 1970's.
IV. Empirical Findings
This section reports estimates of how switches between direct and indirect taxation affect wages, prices, and output. We consider the British and the American experience in turn. The section closes with several qualifications to our findings.
A. The United Kingdom
Equation systems (9) and (10) are estimated using data for the 1963-83 period. The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1. Both systems suggest that changes in the direct vs. indirect tax mix have substantial effects. The null hypothesis that the TMIX coefficients equal zero is rejected decisively in each case. The test statistic in system (9) is 32.5; it is distributed x2(6) under the null hypothesis that the tax mix variables have no effect on the short-run movements in wages, prices, and output. The null hypothesis is rejected at the .O1 level. For system (lo), the test statistic is 27.6. In this case, with only two equations, the test statistic is distributed X2(4)under the null hypothesis; again, we reject the neutrality hypothesis at the .O1 level. These overwhelming rejections suggest the potential importance of nominal rigidities. On the other hand, the long-run neutrality of TMIX is not rejected at conventional significance levels. By comparing the likelihood of (9) to that of a system that does not impose the restriction that the sum of the TMIX coefficients in each equation equal zero, we obtain a test statistic of 3.7 which is distributed as x2 (3) under the hypothesis of long-run neutrality.
To describe the effect of raising indirect taxes, we compute impulse response func- 
XOMGDP S S R Q ( 4 ) S E E
.Voter: All equations are estimated using quarterly data for the 1963:3-1983:4 period. for a total of 82 observations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each equation also includes a time trend, seasonal dummy variables, and wage and price control dummy variables. See the text for further description.
-.20 tions for prices, real after-tax wages, and output with respect to a 1 percent decrease in TMZX. This corresponds to an indirect tax increase of one-half of 1percent of GDP, accompanied by an equal-revenue reduction in direct taxes. If all pre-tax prices remained fixed, the tax-inclusive price level would rise by one-half of 1 percent. The impulse response functions for system (9), labelled UK-9, are shown in Figure 3 . The figure reports both the point estimates of the percentage deviation of each variable from its initial steady-state value, as well as one standard error bands.15
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In the quarter when the tax change occurs, prices rise by three-tenths of 1 percent. They continue to rise for eight quarters thereafter, peaking .54 percent above their initial level. Prices then decline, but remain more than .1 percent above their initial value for four and one-half years after the tax change. For the first five quarters after the shock, the sum of the deviations of the price level from its initial value is 2.04, with a standard error of 0.97. The null hypothesis of no price effects over this horizon is rejected at the .05 level.
"The impulse response function standard errors are computed using standard asymptotic methods. Defining f ( & ,t ) as the impulse response function t periods after the shock, and & the coefficient estimates from (9). we compute the variance of f (&, t ) as vf ' i2 vf , where vf is the vector of derivatives o f f with respect to 2, and i2 is the covariance matrix of b.
Similarly, over a ten-quarter horizon, the sum of the price effects is 4.56, with a standard error of 2.24.
Nominal after-tax wages also rise after the tax change. In the first quarter, they increase by nearly half a percent, raising the firm's real wage by .2 percent. The real wage increases for another quarter and then begins to decline. By seven quarters after the tax reform, real wages have fallen below their initial level and they remain more than .1 percent below their starting point for nearly two years. The figure shows that the wage dynamics are not as well determined as those for prices. The sum of the wage impulses for the first five quarters after the shock is 0.99, with a standard error of 0.90.
The impulse response path also .shows output moving erratically. The estimates of the output response function are imprecise, however. Output rises in the quarter when the shock occurs, and then declines in the next quarter. The sum of output deviations for the five quarters after the shock is -0.07 percent, with a standard error of .61. By ten quarters after the shock, the comparable value is -.310 with a standard error of .465. Six quarters after the tax shock, output enters a long period of decline. At the lowest point on its trajectory, output is .19 percent below its initial level. The individual quarter output effects should be regarded with caution, however, as the large standard errors suggest. The estimates from system (10) also suggest significant tax effects, as can be seen from the impulse response functions in Figure 4 , labelled UK-10. Prices rise by .19 percent in the quarter of the shock, 40 percent of the amount whch would be predicted if pre-tax prices were completely fixed. They decline slowly thereafter, and are still more than .08 percent above their initial level four years afterwards. The standard errors for the impulse response functions from (10) are, however, larger than those from (9). Five quarters after the tax change, the sum of the deviation of prices from their initial level is .66 percent, with a standard error of .71. Real wages again rise for a short while after the tax shock occurs, then decline. Output changes in this system, whch are equal to the negative of the price impulses, display a more stable response pattern than those in system (9).
We explored the robustness of our tax mix results in several ways. We added exchange rates as additional explanatory variables; they had statistically insignificant coefficients and did not affect our rejection of short-run tax neutrality. We also estimated our equations without the indicator variables for wage and price controls, and most of the tax coefficients changed very little. Adding further lagged variables to the system reduced the statistical significance of some coefficient estimates, but had little impact on either our estimated dynamic responses or our rejections of the tax neutrality hypothesis. 16 A possible problem with our results is that movements in TMIX may reflect changes in economic conditions. In order to explore this possibility, we examined the effects of two specific episodes of tax reform in Britain where the relative importance of direct and indirect taxes was altered. In 1979, the VAT was increased and marginal personal income tax rates were cut. In April 1976, valueadded taxes on durables were reduced. Replacing TMIX by dummy variables for these reforms led to conclusions very sirnilar to those reported in this section.17
B. The United States
In this section, we investigate whether our U.K. findings are consistent with the U.S. experience from 1948:l to 1984:3. Estimates 1 6change in the total tax burden also has real effects. In the three-equation system, a 1 percent of GDP increase in the total tax burden reduces output .51 percent in the quarter of the tax change and induces lower output for 3 quarters after the shock. The estimates of TTOT's impact on both prices and output, however, are plagued by very large standard errors.
"~e t a i l s results on the effect of the 1979 tax switch are presented in an earlier version of this paper, available from the authors on request. The inflationary impact of the 1979 tax reform is also discussed in Willem Buiter and Marcus Miller (1981 
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Notes:All equations are estimated using quarterly data for the period 1948:l-1984:3, a total of 147 observations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each equation also includes a time trend, seasonal dummy variables, and wage and price control dummy variables. See the text for further description. of both sets of equations are reported in Table 2 . The central question is whether we can reject the null hypothesis that TMIX should be excluded from systems (9) and (10). For system (9), the test statistic is 21.7. Since it is distributed X2(6) under the shortrun tax neutrality hypothesis, t h s constitutes a rejection at the .O1 level. For system (lo), the two-equation system, the test statistic of 17.8, which is distributed as X2(4) under the null, also implies rejection at the .O1 level. These findings provide strong evidence for the presence of wage or price stickiness in the United States.
To test long-run neutrality, we again compare the likelihood under the assumption that the sum of the coefficients of TMIX is zero to that obtained when relaxing this TAX SHOCK QUARTERS AFTER TAX SHOCK condition. Here we obtain a test statistic of 8.6, whch is distributed X2(3) under the hypothesis of long-run neutrality. Thus this hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level, but not the 1 percent level. The two panels of Figure 5 , respectively labelled US-9 and US-10, report the TMIX impulse response functions corresponding to systems (9) and (10) for the United States. The initial effect of a permanent 1 percent T M I X decrease is a .32 percent increase in prices, just over 60 percent of the impact with fixed producer prices. The absence of significant tax variation makes the standard errors on the estimated price responses larger than those for Britain. The sum of the price changes for the first five quarters after the change is 1.13, with a standard error of 1.63.
The American evidence also differs from the British in suggesting much slower adjustment back to equilibrium.
Real wages also rise after a tax shock, corroborating our British findings. The initial effect of a 1 percent TMIX drop is to raise the firm's real wage by .44 percent. Real wages continue to increase for one additional quarter and then decline monotonically to their initial level. Adjustment is slow; even five years after the shock, real wages are .13 percent above their initial level.
Output experiences a pronounced decline after an increase in indirect taxation. A 1 percent fall in TMIX induces a .2 percent drop in real GNP in the quarter of the tax change. The path of output thereafter depends upon the choice between systems (9) and (10). In (9), output continues to decline for another quarter and falls to .45 percent below its initial level before starting to return to its initial level. The sum of the output effects up to ten quarters after the change is -4.12, with a standard error of 2.73. The results for (10) suggest that the amount of lost output declines after the first quarter, although output returns to its initial level very slowly. The ten-quarter sum equals -2.90 (2.95). Both sets of results are consistent with the view that nominal wages are sticky, since the insufficient nominal wage decline in response to indirect tax increases raises real wages and induces firms to lay off workers. Thls has the ultimate effect of lowering real money balances.
Our findings are insensitive to several specification changes. Excluding Gordon and King's wage-price control variables has little effect on the estimated coefficients and impulse response functions. Adding interest rates, exchange rates, and further lagged values of the currently included variables also has little substantive impact on our conclusions. The central finding, that the short-run tax neutrality hypothesis is strongly rejected, obtains in a wide variety of specifications.
These results can also be used to study the impact of revenue-raising tax increases. A permanent increase in the total tax burden, keeping T M I X constant, increases prices and real wages and causes a drop in output. A 1 percent increase in TTOT raises prices by .38 percent and real wages by .26 percent in the first quarter. Output declines by .81 percent when the shock occurs and continues to fall thereafter. By eight quarters after the tax increase, output is 1.65 percent below its starting value. These findings, while suggestive, are accompanied by large standard errors and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Two potentially important assumptions underlie our use of the TMIX variable to test for the existence of nominal rigidities. First, we assume that TMIX is exogenous in our reduced-form systems. Second, we postulate that except for the effects of wage and price stickiness, changes in TMIX should have no impact on prices or output. The possible failure of parallel assumptions has caused debate about the interpretation of linkages between money and output. We consider each assumption in turn.
Several arguments for the endogeneity of our tax mix variable might be constructed. Perhaps most plausibly, it might be noted that if the output elasticities of direct and indirect taxes are different, then changes in real output will induce changes in TMIX. Price shocks may be transmitted to GNP and then to TMIX as well. This issue is partly addressed by our inclusion of lagged output in the reduced-form system, and by our separate examination of the 1979 and 1976 policy changes in Great Britain. As a further check, we use data on cyclically adjusted revenue collections to create fullemployment TMIX and TTOT variables for the United States.18 These data were only available for the post-1955 period. The results obtained using these variables were similar to those obtained with our unadjusted tax variables, suggesting that cyclical fluctuations are not an important source of 'R~ull-employment data are not available for the U.K. on a quarterly basis. In the United States, data on federal taxes beginning in 1955 are published in Thomas Halloway (1984) . Estimates of high-employment state and local receipts were constructed by the authors. endogeneity for the receipts-based tax measures.19 Unfortunately, the data are not available to examine the effects of cyclical adjustments for Great Britain, or for the entire post-1948 period in the United States.
An alternative argument against the exogeneity of TMIX might hold that the tax mix is set in response to projected economic conditions, or that it helps to forecast future economic policies. The hstorical context which generated changes in TMIX does not support these views. The 1979 tax reform in Great Britain immediately followed an election which was decided on grounds other than tax policy. The avowed purpose of its proponents was to improve incentives through reductions in marginal income tax rates. In the United States, most of the variation in indirect taxes comes from movements in state sales taxes and employer payroll taxes. Neither of these are likely to be manipulated for macroeconomic purposes. More generally, it seems unlikely that governments systematically shft towards indirect taxes when they foresee rising prices or when they intend to pursue more expansionary monetary policy. The 1979 reform in Britain was accompanied by an announced policy of monetary restraint. Nothing in the history of either British or American tax policy suggests that tax changes should help to forecast future monetary policies. This inference is consistent with the failure of Granger causality tests to reject the hypothesis that T M I X does 'not cause either money or TTOT.
A second potential objection to our tests is that T M I X might have effects on output and prices through channels other than wage and price rigidities. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out, since changes in TMIX do not correspond precisely to our theoretical model. Indirect taxes do not cover all goods, and 19~lthough the results using full-employment and unadjusted T M I X are always similar. the resemblance between our equations for the 1948-84 period and the comparison equations for 1955-84 depended upon our choice of price series. The equations using the shelterexclusive C P I are very similar to those for the fullsample period. while those using the G N P deflator are substantially different. direct taxes are not strictly proportional. Nonetheless, it is difficult to explain our findings along these lines. Increases in indirect taxes coupled with equal revenue decreases in direct taxes are usually thought to improve incentives to work and invest. Since indirect taxes are also less progressive than direct taxes, they should have smaller disincentive effects. Thus they should raise output and reduce prices-the opposite of what we find.
There are no controlled experiments in macroeconomics. Nevertheless, we find it difficult to account for our results in terms of the limitations of tax-shift experiments. At a minimum, the flaws in our tax-based tests are largely independent of those in tests which focus on the relationshp between money and output. Our tests therefore provide at least some additional evidence to support the hypothesis of wage and price sticluness.
V. Conclusions
A major thrust of much recent macroeconomic research has been the elucidation of business cycles as equilibria of competitive economies with fully flexible prices. Theories in both the "misperceptions" and "real business cycle" traditions emphasize the assumption of perfect price flexibility and the resulting absence of unexploited opportunities for beneficial exchange. These theories imply strong data restrictions: fully perceived changes in government policy which do not change any agent's opportunity set should have no real effects. In contrast, the essence of contemporary Keynesian thinking is that prices are in some sense sticky, so some purely nominal disturbances do matter.
The difficulty in empirically distinguishing these theories arises from the ~roblem of isolating purely nominal disturbances. Traditionally, they have been tested by examining the relationship between variously measured monetary shocks and real variables. These tests have not been entirely conclusive because a variety of rationalizations, with very different structural implications, can be offered for the comovement of money and output.
In this paper, we rely on tax shocks of a special sort to distinguish between classical and Keynesian models. A clear implication of rnicroeconomic theory with flexible prices is that the side of the market on whch a tax is collected does not influence its ultimate real effects. Tax changes between direct and indirect taxation therefore provide a natural experiinent for examining the importance of nominal rigidities. The appeal of the experiment is enhanced by the apparently unsystematic way in which taxes have varied.
The results of our investigation provide evidence against the classical view that wages and prices are perfectly flexible. Whle arguments may be made to rationalize the comovements we observe with perfectly flexible prices, we find it impossible to convincingly account for the empirical regularities in the data without assuming some sort of price rigidity.
Asserting that prices are rigid falls far short of explaining them or understanding their properties. Our results suggest that t h s remains a vitally important research problem. "Menu costs," whch have been proposed as one explanation for price rigidities, cannot explain why many prices whch can be changed at low cost, such as newsstand magazine prices,20 appear to change infrequently. Moreover, monetary policy appears potent even in highly inflationary economies, where menu costs should be less important.
Our results have potentially important consequences for tax policy. Almost universally, reforms in the tax structure are evaluated within the context of market-clearing models where prices are perfectly flexible. Within such models, the distinction between direct and indirect taxation is of no consequence. Our findings suggest that this distinction may be important over periods of several years, during which prices are not fully flexible. Indeed, the macroeconomic consequences of some reforms may dwarf their microeconomic impact on economic efficiency. If unemployment is a significant "stephen Cecchetti (1984) presents detailed evidence on the inflexibility of magazine prices.
byproduct of certain tax reforms, traditional thinking about their incidence needs to be reconsidered.
Consider as an example current proposals to raise revenue by taxing domestic and imported crude oil. Estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (1985) suggest that this measure would raise about $4.2 billion for each $1 per barrel tax. Thus a $5 a barrel tax would raise the indirect tax burden by $21 billion. Our estimates suggest that if monetary policy were not altered, this would result in lost output of $60 billion over the succeeding decade. Similar estimates are obtained assuming that monetary policy acts to keep nominal GNP constant following the tax reform. These figures bulk large relative to the allocative effects traditionally emphasized in microeconomic analyses of excise tax reforms.
Some might argue that it is inappropriate to assess the outvut effects of tax reforms while holding monetary policy constant, since monetary policy could accommodate tax changes. T h s issue is treated in our paper (in preparation). If the monetary authority has set monetary policy to trade off unemployment and inflation in a desirable way prior to tax reform, however, the loss of welfare from a small tax change will be independent of the monetary policy response. Unless one believes that monetary policy is wrong prior to a tax reform, there is no reason not to evaluate the effects of the tax holding monetary policy constant. T h s is especially true for small reforms in excise taxation. The effects of these reforms would be difficult to disentangle accurately enough for them to be explicitly accommodated by monetary policy.
Our finding that shfts towards indirect taxation have adverse macroeconomic consequences raises an obvious question. Could macroeconomic performance be improved by reducing indirect taxes and increasing direct taxes? The conscious and regular use of such tax policies as stabilization measures would be such a significant change in policy regime that our estimates cannot shed much light on this issue. They do suggest, however, that such a change might well be desirable on a one-shot basis. The gains might be taken either in the form of reduced inflation or increased output. Our paper (in preparation) demonstrates that if output is held constant, tax changes may have a permanent effect on the rate of inflation.
Our results in this paper suggest a number of directions for future research. The robustness of our conclusions might be examined by studying tax changes in other countries or in individual American states. Structural estimation might yield more precise information on the nature of wage and price stickiness, and tax reforms might facilitate identification of these models. The effects of alternative policy responses to large tax reforms might also be considered. Perhaps most importantly, our results isolate a major class of apparent rigidities which economic theory needs to explain.
